Perhaps Didier Deschamps had the right idea from the beginning. Over his 14-year tenure leading France, he has faced scrutiny for being overly conservative, emphasizing stability, and not fully unleashing his array of attacking talent. At this competition, his final one as head coach, Deschamps has become more permissive — at least in terms of tactics; his public demeanor remains as irritable as always. While France delivered some dazzling performances in recent weeks, when they finally met a truly top-tier opponent, they were overwhelmed. A slightly more restrained, Deschamps-like approach might have served them better.
The irony of this tournament has always been that the more brilliantly France performed, the more the years since their World Cup victory seemed like a missed opportunity. The appreciation for their offensive flair in the United States has been mixed with a sense of loss for the excitement and artistry that Deschamps’ stubbornness has withheld from the sport over the past decade. This was the France side that could have existed all along, playing with style and verve, drawing justifiable parallels to the magnificent French team of the early to mid-1980s.
It would be an overstatement now to rank them with the 1954 Hungary, the 1974 Netherlands, or the 1982 Brazil as one of the finest teams not to lift the World Cup, yet such a comparison felt plausible before their 1-0 victory over Paraguay in the round of 16.
Deschamps departs having secured a World Cup title along with another final and a semi-final appearance. He also reached a final and a semi-final at the European Championship. Reaching the last four in five of the last six major tournaments across a span of 14 years sounds like a phenomenal record, and in certain respects it is. However, Deschamps has been gifted with wave after wave of exceptional players; one piece of silverware from that talent pool might only be meeting the minimum expectation. And a critique, expressed most loudly by those fatigued by his football labeur, suggests that for all his visible achievements, Deschamps ultimately held the team back.
So why did he alter his strategy? He has been depicted by some as the ultimate pragmatist, dedicated not strictly to control or to a more free-flowing game, but simply to whatever suited the players he had. The dramatic shift in perception reveals just how unusual Deschamps’ lineup choices have appeared.
At the European Championship two years ago, France were seen as the grim, defensive outfit, performing an unattractive version of the “tournament-ball” that won them the World Cup in 2018, whereas Spain were the stylish evolution of juego de posición, able to hold the ball in midfield but made more dangerous by the speed and directness of their wide attackers. In this competition, however, as France sparkled, it was Spain, their wide offensive threats diminished by injuries, who managed to stifle their opponents.
Including the Nations League, this marks three consecutive tournaments where Spain have defeated France at the semi-final stage, a victory for structured, process-oriented football.
Kylian Mbappé had another memorable tournament but the attacking quartet were easily nullified by Spain. Photograph: Marcel van Dorst/DeFodi Images/Shutterstock
A theory suggests that Deschamps was compelled toward a tactical reset by the sheer brilliance of his creative choices, and that could well be accurate, but France have possessed great attacking options for at least the last decade — perhaps not as numerous or diverse as they are now. Deschamps always appeared hesitant to simply let his forwards play, to release the handbrake; this match perfectly illustrated his reasoning.
The French lineup had only two questionable areas: the midfield and the left-back position. Unfortunately, those weaknesses corresponded directly with Spain’s two greatest strengths. On the most immediate level, the penalty resulted from Lamine Yamal enticing a clumsy challenge from Lucas Digne, but on a deeper level it stemmed from Spain’s superiority in midfield.
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The discussion in previous weeks centered on whether, facing stronger opposition, Deschamps would substitute an attacker for an extra midfielder, shifting from a 4-2-3-1 to a 4-3-3. France’s attacking play had been so thrilling that the idea eventually seemed inconceivable, yet in this context it would likely have been wise. During stretches of the first half, Aurélien Tchouaméni and Adrien Rabiot were simply overmatched. As it happened, Deschamps’ response was not to reinforce the pair but to remove Rabiot. Despite a solid tournament, he endured a dreadful first half and, having received a caution, was an obvious candidate for a red card.
What if they had started Tchouaméni, Rabiot and Manu Koné together? What if they had fielded only two from Michael Olise, Ousmane Dembélé and Bradley Barcola alongside Kylian Mbappé? Given the minimal impact those three had, the outcome could not have been worse. With Spain controlling the middle of the pitch, the much-lauded front four simply did not receive the ball enough. Spain’s organization neutralized them, and with too many players dedicated to creative duties, France became exposed to counter-attacks.
In his final loss, Deschamps found his ultimate justification. Raw talent should never be completely relied upon.
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